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Abstract  
In this research we have analyzed the financial system as it is today, describing the 
implications financial innovation had and the impact of the recent financial crisis. We 
tried to understand the nature of the financial stress and its measures. In the context 
of world financial integration it was also necessary to have a review upon the 
financial stress transmission channels from developed to emerging countries, 
determining the linkages and their measures. We employed a structural VAR model 
to determine whether there is empirical proof of financial Stress transmission from 
developed to emerging countries and see if financial integration represents the 
decisive factor in financial stress transmission. Our results suggest that there is a 
significant impact of financial stress in developed countries on the output of 
emerging ones. However we can observe an increasing influence of country-specific 
factors in explaining the variation in the rest of the variable of our model. The results 
also indicate the level of international financial integration being an important 
condition for the financial stress transmission. 
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1 Introduction  
The process of globalization is thought to have started after Second World War, and 
there are many aspect of it. However we can distinguish several features that 
contributed to the world integration. These are: 1. internationalization of production 
including changes in structure of production, 2. expansion of international trade and 
services, and 3. widening and deepening of international capital flows. (Mrak, 2000) 
As the proper financial integration took place through institutions and capital flows, 
recent financial crisis has proven that world integration can bring both benefits as 
well as risks.  
In recent years a number of studies analyze the impact of recent financial 
crises on world economy, focusing on financial linkages between advanced and 
emerging countries, on cross-border determinants of capital outflows and spillover 
effects. However we paid more attention to the ones exploring the impact of financial 
stress episodes on real economy. (Cardarelli, Elekdag, & Lall, May 2009)  for an 
example, have determined that financial stress is not always a precursor to an 
economic slowdown or recession. Moreover their results indicate that particularly 
banking stress tends to have a greater effect on economy, and recessions caused take 
about five quarters to recover. (Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag, & Tytell, June 
2009) determined signs of financial stress transmission from advanced economies to 
emerging ones, rising the levels of financial stress in emerging countries above those 
seen during the Asian crisis. The authors also established that financial links have a 
significant effect in the transmission process, making reference to bank lending to 
emerging countries. (Kim, Kim, & Ro, 2011) Apply a SVAR model in order to 
investigate the dynamic relationship between financial uncertainty and real output 
growth in Korea. The authors found that U.S. financial stress significantly decreases 
growth in real output for at least two quarter. Another research paper analyzes the 
spillovers of three distinct external shocks in the ASEAN -5 economies. (Hwa, April 
2012) has found that external financial shock transmit to the specific countries 
causing output and prices to decline. We should mention that the obtained results 
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differ among countries depending on which extent the economies are exposed to 
external financing.  
Our study concentrates on establishing if there is any empirical proof of 
financial stress transmission from Developed to Emerging countries. Applying a 
structural vector autoregressive model we are going to analyze how a global financial 
shock in advanced countries impacts the real economy of a sample set of countries 
chosen arbitrarily from the list of emerging countries. As a benchmark for the level of 
financial stress in developed countries we are going to use the Financial Stress Index 
(FSI) developed by (Cardarelli, Elekdag, & Lall, May 2009). We also are making an 
assumption that each emerging country behaves as a small open economy, thus it is 
heavily dependent on external environment and has no influence upon developed 
economies. As a result of our analysis we would like also to determine if financial 
integration represents the decisive factor in Financial Stress transmission. 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reflects a historical perspective 
on current financial crisis describing the new elements brought to the financial 
system. As well it presents the impact of the crises on world economy. Chapter 3 
provides a proper definition for the financial stress and its measures. We are also 
describing the financial transmission channels from developed to emerging countries. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical methodology applied and interprets the dataset and 
empirical results. Chapter 5 summarizes our findings.  
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2 Financial System in the Reality of 
Current Financial Crisis 
2.1 A historical perspective on the current financial crisis  
The recent financial crisis may be viewed just as a common pattern of the world 
economy as we have developed it. Nowadays events reflect just consequences of an 
imperfect system that has been continuously modified and adjusted to each event 
threatening to crush an economy that seemed at some point to have signs of stable 
growth. Examples include the crises of 1857, 1893, 1907, 1929-1933, 1973, 1987, 
1998, 2000. Both advanced and emerging economies have known devastating 
financial collapses, but none of these events had reached such a wide spread since the 
Great Depression.  
According to business cycle theory economies register a repeating pattern. 
Cycles consist of five stages: expansion, peak, recession, trough and recovery. 
Therefore we can assume that each cycle shares specific common characteristics. 
Mainly we can speak about common conditions to past financial crises. (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2008) As crises always have been a subject of research, economic literature 
is rich in studies and databases keeping track of past events.  We will make reference 
to the work of (Laeven & Valencia, 2008), who created a database of systemic 
banking crises for the period 1970-2007 providing details on crisis containment and 
resolution policies. The authors have identified several conditions prior to the crises 
which are characterized by asset price increases, lending booms which led to 
excessive indebtedness, weak macroeconomic condition build-up of marginal loans 
and systemic risk. Large macroeconomic imbalances and unsustainable fiscal policies 
are considered to be the origins as an example of the crises in Russia (1998), 
Argentina (2001), on average the fiscal balances tending to be negative (-2.1 on 
average), current accounts being in deficit by 3.9 percent and inflation reaching on 
average as high as 137 percent. However, the nature of the East Asian crises was 
more characterized by foreign exchange risk and unsustainable maturity composition 
of debt. Respectively the non-performing loans tend to reach levels of 75 percent of 
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total loans and a share of 25 percent of loans. A substantial risk could also represent 
the connected loans that may impact several banks at once in case of a crisis. Another 
common condition represents a rapid credit growth. Average annual growth in private 
credit to GDP prior to the crisis is about 8.3 percent and reaches 34.1 percent the 
maximum. These booms often took place as a result of a process of financial 
liberalization. Nonetheless crisis-affected countries often suffer from weak legal 
institutions, benefiting a low assets quality.  
In 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank became the symbolic start of 
the most dramatic financial crises since then, gaining its name of Great Recession, as 
we all know the recent financial crisis. The connection does not end here. Making 
reference to (Partnoy, 2009), it was during the 1930s when regulators developed rules 
based on credit ratings. These may be considered the initiation of today’s regulatory 
reliance on ratings, and we can only guess what would have happened without 
financial innovation and overreliance on credit ratings.  
Analyzing the initial conditions we could classify the respective factors in two 
major groups: Macroeconomic and Microeconomic. Macroeconomic environment 
can be characterized by almost a decade of low global interest rates inducing excess 
of global liquidity, figure 2.1. This in turn contributed to increase in demand for 
credits and investments leading to a significant increase in housing prices, figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Real interest rates 2000 – 2008 (Percent change from one year earlier) 
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Figure 2.2 Residential Property Prices (12-month percent change) 
Source: IMF, WEO, October 2008.  
At the microeconomic level, low short term interest rates initiated a pursue on 
the part of banks and institutional investors for yield. A series of financial 
innovations (Bhatia, 2007) were meant to provide these higher returns but in 
exchange many of them were to sacrifice transparency, therefore increasing risk. This 
peculiarity generated new instruments of securitization, which allowed large 
commercial banks to generate loans in order to sell them on to other financial 
institutions, who in turn would bundle them into asset-backed securities and so forth. 
The reason for these loan sales was the transfer of risk to the ultimate buyer of the 
security, which by idea should have been backed by the underlying mortgage loan. A 
misperception of the risk involved, made the market believe that there was an 
arbitrage opportunity and only increased the demand for these products. Due to this 
scheme banks profited from administrative and process fees without having to fulfill 
capital requirements or need to raise liabilities to cover the assets. Low interest rates 
also diminished the incentives to keep on-balance-sheet liquid assets. (Barrell & 
Davis, 2008) 
The imperfection of the regulatory system overlooked the vulnerabilities 
induced by this process. Respectively the heavily regulated sector became the 
originators of this process, transferring the risk to the ultimate holders of the 
securities, who were beyond the scope of regulators. As a result the regulated 
segment ended up being significantly affected due to spillover effects and high levels 
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In fact we can observe that a single piece of financial innovation lead to the 
creation of a risky environment. Traditionally we could claim that banks shed just a 
few risks from their balance sheets, such as consumer credits or generally risks that 
were less sensitive through loan sales or credit guarantees. However credit 
derivatives, as example Credit Default Swaps (CDS), allowed banks to trade credit 
risks on a variety of exposures. The market grew rapidly, the value of CDS in G10 
countries according to Bank of International Settlements (BIS) statistics was under 60 
trillion US dollars. (IOSCO, 2012) 
Making reference to the work of Nathaniel Frank and Heiko Hesse, we can 
say that the origins for recent crisis were mainly the quality of subprime mortgages 
rather than a liquidity problem. Rising interest rates for refinancing and falling house 
prices increased the delinquencies on subprime mortgages. As a result, the 
uncertainty concerning the value of structured credit products only increased. A 
logical response reaction followed, downgrading many of the related securities and 
changes of the evaluation methodology by rating agencies. It was only a matter of 
time until investors would avoid investing in structured products. (Frank & Hesse, 
2009) 
We could better assess the magnitude of the current financial crisis comparing 
the losses to past events. As we can see in Figure 2.3, by 2008 only bank losses 
amounted 775 billion U.S. dollars, exceeding even the Japan banking crisis which 
lasted a decade. 
 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of Financial Crises (losses in billion dollars) 
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As we have mentioned it earlier the financial innovation brought some new 
features to the recent financial crises, these including more sophisticated financial 
intermediaries and instruments, as well as an increased level of interconnectedness. 
As a consequence a large reliance on wholesale and short-term funding turned to be a 
systemic fragility. Too Interconnected-to-fail or Too Big-to-Fail (TBTF) represent 
two notions highly discussed in the context of recent financial crises. The first one is 
usually pointed out to be the more accurate to speak of. Both the economists and 
politicians could spot the moral hazard threat. The TBTF financial firms are tied to 
many other firms in other financial markets, therefore if they fail it can easily set off a 
chain of reaction that leads to widespread collapse of many financial firms and 
markets. The common sense suggests that government and central bank will not 
allow the economy to face such a threat. Knowing this, many of the firms would take 
too much risk and leverage beyond the moral hazard on which the economic 
argument focuses. The political argument is always closely related with the economic 
one, large institutions with much disposable cash usually benefit of a privilege in the 
political organizations, making the bailouts more likely. (McDonnell, 2008) 
However, according to (Eichengreen, 2009), the existence of such firms does 
not represent the main problem. Deregulation, as represented by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act in the U.S. and the Single Market Act in Europe, allowed financial 
institutions to take on additional risk. The regulated sector had to compete with a 
large number of unregulated institutions and markets which in their activity are very 
similar to banks and are also subject of contagious panics. Size and diversity of the 
institutions contributes to economic stability, but deregulation manages to create a 
system which includes “shadow” banking. These are only consequences of a vital 
necessity to cope with increasing competition. 
The financial conditions in the household sector are vital in every crisis but in 
the recent one played an unusually notable role. The majority of the earlier episodes 
of financial distress originated in the official sector (e.g., Latin America’s debt crisis 
of the 1980s) or the banking and corporate sectors (e.g., the East Asian crisis). The 
recent crisis was different, the financial distress being spread through mortgage loans, 
creating a direct link between the financial and real sector. (Claessens, Dell'Ariccia, 
Igan, & Laeven, 2010) 
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2.2 The performance of countries during financial crisis 
Before starting our analysis of the impact the recent financial crisis had upon world 
economy we would like to mention some interesting findings provided by IMF. We 
would expect that episodes of financial stress would lead to a significant or noticeable 
effect on real economy, but only half of the 113 episodes identified during 30 years, 
lead to an actual slowdown or recession. However, the nature of a stress episode 
represents a key determinant of the impact magnitude. As the recent crisis has a 
financial nature we find relevant to mention, that the same study indicates episodes 
associated with banking crises to have a more severe macroeconomic impact than 
others. The impact manifests through twice as long periods characterized by negative 
dynamics and twice as intense, resulting in four times bigger cumulative output loss. 
(International Monetary Fund, April 2009)  
Speaking about the proper impact of the crisis it was estimated that the global 
GDP contracted by 6.96 percent (annualized) only in the fourth quarter of 2008, and 
has fallen by 5.84 percent in the first quarter of 2009. Figure 2.4 reflects global GDP 
growth rates as of first quarter in 2007 to the forecasted growth rates in third quarter 
2013. The advanced economies registered 8.71 percent and 8.35 percent decline in 
the same period respectively. According to WEO from April 2009 world industrial 
production plummeted in the fourth quarter of 2008 and fall by 12.07 percent in 
2009. 
  
Figure 2.4 Global GDP Growth (percent; quarter over quarter, annualized)  
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 We can also outline that emerging countries have also suffered hardly; from a 
4.16 percent increase in GDP registered in the third quarter of 2008, it fall by 4.30 
percent (annualized) in fourth quarter, followed by an average 2.23 percent decline in 
first quarter of 2009. 
The global economy was expected to contract by 1.3 percent in 2009, 
nevertheless according to (International Monetary Fund, April 2010) it registered a 
0.6 percent contraction; however the numbers differ much among countries.  
Speaking about the Emerging and Developing Economies, the worst affected 
region represents the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) seeing a 
contraction of 6.6 percent. It was followed by Central and Eastern Europe countries 
facing a contraction of 3.7 percent. Some other regions managed to avoid recession, 
knowing declines in marginal growth rates, such as Developing Asia, Middle East 
and North Africa. Having a comparative analysis for example ASEAN countries 
grew only by 1.7 percent in 2009, comparing to 6.3 percent growth in 2007. We 
would like also to remark that while the emerging Asia has been growing by ~ 2 
percent, developing countries in the region managed to grow by 6.6 percent. China 
and India grew only by 8.7 percent and 5.7 percent respectively comparing to 13 
percent and 9.3 percent in 2007 respectively. Guiding same IMF publications we can 
say that downturn in many Asian economies in late 2008 was of a greater magnitude 
and speed than expected, but the same was the recovery. 
 On the other side Advance Economies had a more pessimistic performance, 
registering a contraction of 3.2 percent in 2009, and specifically United States (-2.4), 
Euro Area (-4.1), Japan (-5.2), Germany (-5), France (-2.2), United Kingdom (-4.9), 
Italy (-5), Spain (-3.6). 
 As concerning the financial impact, we can start from analyzing the dynamics 
of nonperforming loans (NPL). The April 2010 Global Financial Stability Report 
(GFSR), indicates that the NPL in United States for example increased from 0.8 
percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2009, United Kingdom from 0.9 percent to 3.3 
percent. On average the percentage of NPL in Advanced Economies doubled. In the 
case of Emerging Economies the figures are also pretty spread. An example for the 
heterogeneity is Romania and Turkey where NPL grew from 2.8 percent in 2006 to 
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14.8 percent in 2009, as in the second country we see an increase from 3.9 percent to 
5.7 percent. A better image can be obtained by looking to the volumes of bank write-
downs and loan loss provisions over 2007–10 were initially estimated to reach 2.8 
trillion U.S. dollars, but the estimations were lowered to 2.3 trillion U.S. dollars, two-
thirds of which had been recognized at the end of 2009. Thus in order to quantify the 
losses we can say that the share of total write-downs out of total loans of U.S banks 
represented 7.3 percent equal to 588 billion U.S. dollars, and the share out of total 
securities is 6.6 percent which represent 296 billion of U.S. dollars. In the case of 
Euro area banks total loans and securities write-downs constituted 665 billion U.S. 
dollars. United Kingdom was also majorly affected, the volume of write-downs 
reached 455 billion U.S. dollars. (International Monetary Fund, April 2010) 
 Investment was meant to sustain the growth of the economies, but in the 
conditions of high uncertainty it had to be postponed, economies having to rely 
mostly on consumption. Thus in advanced economies real gross fixed investment 
growth rates started to diminish even starting second quarter of 2007, reaching its 
worse situation in first quarter of 2009, that is a contraction of 21.51 percent. 
Specifically the investment in machinery and equipment has known a contraction of 
27.9 percent. As presented in figure 2.5 the crises left long term impact on 
investment, advanced economies having to cope with negative growth rates even in 
2011.  
 
Figure 2.5 Real Gross Fixed Investment (percent; quarter over quarter, annualized)  











2007Q1 2007Q3 2008Q1 2008Q3 2009Q1 2009Q3 2010Q1 2010Q3 2011Q1 2011Q3 2012 Q1
Advanced economies Emerging economies
Financial System in the Reality of Current Financial Crisis  11 
  
Figure 2.6 Merchandise Exports 
(percent; three-month moving average (3mma) over previous 3mma, annualized) 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Update July 2012 
 
Emerging economies faced its worse period during fourth quarter of 2008 and 
first quarter of 2009, registering a contraction of 5.32 percent and 3.4 percent 
respectively. 
We should also mention that in 2009 the world trade volume contracted by 
10.7 percent. Both imports and exports registered negative growth rates. More 
specifically imports registered in Advanced Economies (-12 percent), in Emerging 
and Developing Economies (-8.4 percent). Exports had similar performance 
registering in Advanced Economies (-11.7 percent) and in Emerging and Developing 
Economies   (-8.2 percent). Figure 2.6 reflects merchandise exports’ growth rate in 
Advanced and Emerging economies. Therefore we can see that in January 2009 
world’s three month moving average of exports reduced by 62.79 percent comparing 
to volumes registered in the month before that. In fact throughout 9 months, starting 
September 2008, the world exports registered a negative trend, this pattern being 
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3 Financial Stress Transmission Analysis 
3.1 Defining Financial Stress and its measures 
The recent financial crisis represents a great example for the periods of financial 
instability and stress resulting in massive impact on world economy. Despite the fact 
that it has originated in the financial sector it affected the real economy through 
various channels. Similar to recent financial crisis, threats originated at the micro 
level, such as the shocks that affect the creditworthiness of borrowers, transmit to 
macro level, increasing the output fluctuations through the financial accelerator. That 
is, as the consent of the financial system to grant credit to the economy directly 
depend on the values of collateral. From the lender’s point of view, events and factors 
impacting the balance sheet will also increase economic downturns. As a normal 
response reaction banks usually become more selective in providing capital to the 
real sector or suspend providing credits, leading to sharper economic downturns. 
Thus we can confirm that the development and structure of the financial system 
determine the degree of interconnection between real and financial sectors in the 
economy.  (Peltonen & Lo Duca, March 2011) 
Nowadays we can observe and realize the importance of the financial sector 
in the economy, thus it is vital to understand the impact of the financial cycles on real 
economy and how they emerge, episodes of financial stress being analyzed and taken 
into account. Although it is hard to define or specify a certain definition for the 
financial stress, according to (Hakkio & Keeton, 2009) “financial stress can be 
thought of as an interruption to the normal functioning of financial markets”. 
According to (Grimaldi, June 2010), “financial stress is the product of vulnerable 
markets and of shocks that can be exogenous or, more likely, endogenous”.  
According to the same authors these episodes tend to involve certain 
phenomena which are associated to the financial stress. Generally speaking financial 
stress can be identified by the presence of relatively high uncertainty among lenders 
and investors about the fundamental value of financial assets. The resulting cash flow 
from stocks, bonds and loans depend on forthcoming economic conditions, thus high 
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uncertainty about these conditions make investors and lenders become less sure of the 
present discounted value of the cash flows, and as a consequence of the fundamental 
value of the financial asset. Making reference to the recent financial crisis, we can 
outline the notion of Knightian uncertainty, which arise in the cases when new 
financial instruments or practice register losses for the first time, being the case of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Thus lacking any historical experience, 
investors may lack any reasoning about the probabilities of returns to the product, as 
a consequence increasing uncertainty about the fundamental value of the asset.  
The investor’s risk profile is one pattern that everybody is used to consider, 
but another form of uncertainty increasing during financial crises concerns the 
behavior of the investor. As the expected return for an investor depends both on the 
hold-to-maturity value of the asset and actions of other investors, they come up with 
anticipating “what average opinion expects average opinion to be”. This particular 
behavior becomes more emphasized when investors become more uncertain about the 
fundamental values of assets.  Consequently when investors form their opinions 
based on assumptions about other investors’ decisions, prices of financial assets do 
not reflect any more the fundamental values which leads to increased volatility of 
asset prices. 
Another sign of financial stress represents the increased asymmetry of 
information between parties in a financial transaction. It is important to mention that 
information gaps or information asymmetry can lead to problems of adverse selection 
or moral hazard. As a result we can observe increases in average cost of borrowing 
and reduction in average price of assets on the secondary market. Making reference 
to the recent financial crisis, we can recall that owners had an informational 
advantage in estimating how much the securities were worth, as a consequence of 
complexity of structured financial products. Hence we can claim that asymmetric 
information concerning the true value of the asset generates the “lemons problem”, 
which states the case when a buyer does not know whether the agent is selling the 
security because of a need for liquidity, or because he is trying to get rid of the toxic 
assets. As follows it would be easier to assume that most securities offered for sale 
are of low quality. (Kirabaeva, September 2009) 
The fourth sign of financial stress can be characterized by a strong 
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unwillingness to hold risky financial assets, which offers a good reasoning for lenders 
and investors to demand higher expected returns on risky assets and lower returns on 
safe assets. Thus widening of spreads between the rates of return on the two 
categories of assets can be observed and an increase in the cost of borrowing for 
relatively risky borrowers.  
As the market conditions worsen during crisis, investors’ preference for 
liquidity is increasing, this being the last sign of financial stress. This aspect is also 
manifesting through widening of the spread between the rates of return on the two 
types of assets and leads to increasing the cost of borrowing for those firms issuing 
relative illiquid securities. Facing a thin secondary market for the issued security, the 
investor also risks to be forced to offer big cuts in price, when trying to resell it. 
Therefore wide spreads are meant to compensate for possible losses.  
 
3.1.1 Financial Stress Index 
Financial distress such as asset price bubbles bursts, financial and currency or 
banking crises impact the economy represent the ground for the stress observed in 
several market segments. The larger and broader the shock is, the higher the co-
movement among variables reflecting tensions. Level of stress can be considered as 
being induced by the interaction between financial exposure and the size of the 
shocks. A measure of financial stress able to identify these systemic events can be 
considered a Financial Stress Index (FSI) evaluating at which levels it has, on 
average affected the real economy. In economic literature, we can encounter various 
indexes constructed by aggregating variables, which size the stress across markets 
segments, and aim to capture the start and the evolution of a crisis.  
 One of the examples to consider is the Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
(KCFSI), constructed by (Hakkio & Keeton, 2009). The variables included reflect 
prices or yields on financial markets, as market prices and yields incorporate the 
largest amount of information and quickly respond reflecting the changes in financial 
conditions. Considering the frequency requirements and availability of data, the 
Index comprises the following data: 3-month LIBOR/T-Bill spread, 2-year swap 
spread, off-the-run/on-the-run 10-year treasury spread, Aaa/10-year Treasury spread, 
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Baa/Aaa spread, high-yield bond/Baa spread, consumer ABS/5-year Treasury spread, 
correlation between returns on stock and treasury bonds, implied volatility of overall 
stock prices, idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock prices and cross-section dispersion 
of bank stock returns. 
Another comparable index was developed by the economists from the Bank of 
Canada (Illing & Liu, June 2003). The authors tested different weighting methods for 
aggregating the index, applying: Factor analysis method, Credit weights method, 
Variance-equal weights method and Transformations using sample cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) method. We can mention that  the index developed by 
Illing and Liu  has some common variables with the KCFSI, such as a corporate bond 
spread, a measure of liquidity in the Treasury market (the bid-ask spread), and a 
measure of volatility in the overall stock market. It is also important to mention that 
the Bank of Canada considered it relevant to include index variables such as 
exchange rate volatility, that are to be considered in the case of a small open 
economy like. Other differences we can outline are that Canadian authors included 
the slope of the yield curve, which is related more to monetary policy than financial 
stress. However it fails to include any measures of investor uncertainty about bank 
stock prices. 
In a recent European Central Bank research regarding financial stress in the 
euro area, the author (Grimaldi, June 2010), selected 16 market-based individual 
variables as basic financial measures. Being more specific, the variables reflect 
vulnerabilities in the corporate and government bond, banking, equity and money 
markets. The constructed index also contains several measures such as implied stock 
volatility, in order to reflect the mood of financial markets and measure of agents’ 
risk attitudes  
A financial stress index to which many papers make reference, and aligns 
with the objectives of our research is the one constructed by (Cardarelli, Elekdag, & 
Lall, May 2009). We can outline several disadvantages of previous mentioned 
indexes: historical approach applied by other authors capture only episodes that had 
large output consequences and, and less consideration has been given to episodes of 
financial stress with little macroeconomic impact. We can also mention the fact that 
these indexes fail to identify when financial stress peaked, and whether an economic 
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downturn can meaningfully be linked to the financial stress episode. Also they fail to 
identify episodes of considerable duration and varying intensity. The last argument 
refers to the banking and currency crises, where the historical approach pay little 
attention to pure securities market stresses or liquidity squeezes. Therefore in order to 
overcome these drawbacks, Cardarelli identifies episodes of financial stress as 
extreme values of a composite variable. 
 The Financial Stress Index computed for each country is constructed as a 
variance-weighted average of three sub-indices being representative for the banking, 
securities and foreign exchange market. As follows we will shortly describe each 
variable included. 
 Thus the first component of the bank related sub-index is the Banking sector β 
which is a measure of the correlation between the total returns to the banking-sector 
stock index and the overall stock market index. According to the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, a beta greater than one, suggests that the banking sector is relatively 
risky. Considering that banks generate income by transforming short-term liabilities 
(deposits) into longer-term assets (loans), the authors use the inverted term spread 
which is computed as the difference between the short-term and long-term yields on 
government issued securities. A negative term spread may be an indicator of a serious 
decrease in banking profitability. And the last one is the TED spread, which is 
computed as the difference between interbank rates and the yield on Treasury bills, 
representing a proxy for counter party risk. 
 In order to capture the stress events in the securities market, corporate spreads 
were selected as a proxy for risk in the debt market, being computed as the difference 
between corporate bond yields minus long-term government bond yields. Stock 
market returns is used to capture the observation that many asset prices tend to reflect 
volatility clustering, especially when uncertainty rises in financial markets. 
 As for the foreign exchange-related sub-index, time-varying volatility of 
monthly changes in the nominal effective exchange rate was used being derived from 
a GARCH (1,1) specification. 
 The index constructed by Cardarelli, simplifies the identification of four 
fundamental characteristics of financial stress events: large shifts in asset prices  
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which are identified with the help of stock and bond market returns; an abrupt 
increase in risk/uncertainty (stock and foreign exchange volatility); abrupt shifts in 
liquidity (TED spreads); and the health of the banking system (the beta of banking 
sector stocks and the yield curve, which affects the profitability of intermediating 
short-term liabilities into long-term assets). Analyzing this subcomponents it can be 
possible to identify which types of financial stress (banking related, securities market 
related, currency related, or a combination of these) have been associated with larger 
output consequences. 
The authors of this paper have chosen to apply an asset-price strategy in order 
to determine the financial stress events, as it will offer several advantages comparing 
to the quantity-based approach recommended by the corporate finance literature. FSI 
was constructed for each of the 17 countries in the sample selected by Cardarelli. If 
we recall the events in the recent financial crises, we would appreciate the increasing 
importance of the financial sector in the economy, and moreover the second reason 
for supporting the asset price based approach is the fact that, changes in broader 
financial asset prices can be expected to have a greater role in the ability of financial 
firms to supply intermediation services than in the ability of specific nonfinancial 
corporates to fund new investment. As a third reason to support their decision, the 
authors imply that it offers are better perspective in determining which  financial 
stress episodes are associated with a significant economic impact, identifying initially 
the financial stress events based on asset prices, and then using quantity-based 
variables.  
As follows, figure 3.1reflects the evolution of the financial stress in Advanced 
and Emerging economies. The index reaches its maximum level for both advanced 
and emerging economies in the fourth quarter of 2008. The figure shows that the 
financial stress index was higher in advanced economies like never before, and in 
emerging countries the levels exceeded those registered during Asian crisis. We can 
also observe that financial stress in emerging countries’ financial stress crossed the 
zero levels with a delay of 3 quarters comparing to the dynamics in advanced 
economies, representing the time delay necessary for the stress transmission. 
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Figure 3.1 Financial Stress in Emerging and Advanced Economies 
(Level of index, GDP weighted) 
Source: IMF, WP/09/133. 
 
3.2 Transmission Channels from Developed to Emerging 
Countries 
Although recent financial crisis originated in developed countries, we cannot make 
abstraction of the consequences it had on emerging markets and attribute the negative 
dynamics to other episodes. As we have mentioned previously, the financial 
integration of world economy took place through institutions and capital flows. 
Therefore we can speak of specific transmission channels that allowed for contagion 
among countries. 
 In their research (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2010), described a few channels, 
and mainly the one mostly related to the recent financial crisis represents: the 
exposure to U.S asset backed by sub-prime mortgages. The study also indicates that a 
rather high exposure was in several developed European countries such as: Germany, 
United Kingdom, and France. A relevant measure to capture the size of the 
transmission channels is thought to be the cross-border position. Further the authors 
would present the banks pulling back funds as being another transmission channel to 
be considered. As many emerging economies would rely on external financing and 
mainly bond financing we can consider it a relevant channel. We should also mention 
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reduce leverage because of the withdrawals. This intensity of this channel can be 
sized taking into account measures of gross and net external debt liabilities. 
 Global increase in risk aversion is also mentioned to be a driver of financial 
stress among countries. This channel in turn is influenced by the size of the real estate 
and asset price bubbles as well as by the volumes of additional losses originated from 
the underpricing of risk. 
 And the last channel identified by the authors represents the global collapse in 
trade, and particularly in demand for durable and investment goods, driven by 
uncertainty, scarce availability of credits. Here we would like to stress one important 
factor as degree of trade openness which increases the risk to external demand 
shocks. 
The size of this linkage can be measured by dividing exports to advanced 
economies to domestic GDP. The statistics for the past 20 years indicate that trade 
linkages have become increasingly important. As a share of GDP in emerging 
economies, the exports to advanced economies has risen from less than 10 percent to 
nearly 20 percent. One interesting aspect of crisis transmission via both trade and 
financial linkages represents the possibility of second-round effects, which takes 
place through spillovers from affected emerging economies back to advanced 
economies and also through spillovers within the group of emerging economies. 
(International Monetary Fund, April 2009) 
Stéphane Dees & Filippo di Mauro supports trade channel as being important 
in the transmission process. The increasing relevance of external trade makes 
economies more vulnerable to external shocks, either positive or negative. It is 
important to mention that theoretically, the impact of trade integration on 
synchronization of cycles depends on the nature of trade whether it is intra- or inter-
industry trade and the type of shocks, the empirical evidence shows a strong, positive 
link between trade linkages and output correlation. As concerning the financial 
channel the authors make reference to the studies of Imbs, (2004 and 2006), 
sustaining that while some studies have pointed out a positive relationship between 
financial integration and business cycle co-movements in the case of advanced 
economies, this result runs against the forecasts of a standard international business 
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cycle model and is challenged when it is extended to developing economies (Backus 
et al., 1992). (Dees & di Mauro, 2010)  
Moreover in their study Dees & di Mauro state the fact that countries with 
similar patterns of sectorial specialization are more likely to be hit by similar 
industry-specific shocks. This should make their business cycles more synchronized, 
all other things being the same. That is why it is relevant to consider cross-country 
differences in sectorial specialization. 
In their study (Kamin & DeMarco, 2010) tried a different approach 
identifying two rationales for the contagion and financial stress transmission. Direct 
contagion, refers to changes in asset prices and other financial developments that link 
to financial linkages. For example oil prices represent a sensitive factor that can 
impact the economy and spreads across countries. But these also spread through 
trade, bankruptcy, or high uncertainty. As in the case of recent financial crisis the 
holding of U.S assets or dependence on U.S. dollar funding can be included among 
main linkages. Indirect contagion refers to herding behavior and panics across 
countries.  
We find interesting the classification proposed by the International Monetary 
Fund, distinguishing between common and country-specific factors. Global shifts in 
market sentiment, cross-country contagion and herding behavior in markets represent 
co-movement of stress that has similar effects across countries. This effect and 
mainly the significance of these factors are closely related to the level of financial 
integration of the emerging countries in the world financial system. These particular 
factors can be attributed to common ones. On the other side, country-specific factors 
refer to economic and financial linkages between developed and emerging countries, 
as well as domestic environment which is highly influenced by the structure, 
specialization, policies and domestic vulnerabilities. (International Monetary Fund, 
April 2009) 
In the same WEO, the authors give a more quantitative measure for the 
transmission channel that goes along with the theoretical background in the studies 
analyzed earlier. Starting from the idea that stress can commence as a response to 
actual or incipient capital outflows originated by investors in advanced economies 
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following a financial shock. Then we can estimate the size of the channel by dividing 
foreign liabilities to advanced economies to domestic GDP. We should also consider 
the opposite channel that links to the emerging economy assets invested in developed 
economies experiencing a crisis. A respective measure for this channel would be the 
ratio of assets held in advanced economies to domestic GDP. Analyzing the data we 
can say, that the later one is relevant for the Middle East countries, which are known 
for massive capital exports. 
A more microeconomic perspective is considered in the study of Goldstein 
(1998), who introduces the notion of “wake-up call”. It refers to the behavior of 
investors, when a crisis in one country might influence them to have similar 
expectations of losses for the other countries with similar characteristics, as a result 
inducing stress episodes without an existent threat. Alternatively making reference to 
Hendricks, Kambhu, and Mosser, (2006) a run on the liabilities of financial 
institutions in one country might raise concerns about the liquidity positions of 
institutions in other countries, creating premises for institution runs. 
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4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Methodology  
In order to investigate the relationship between the financial instability and real 
economy, we are going to apply a structural VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model 
which is a standard multivariate time series model.  
In 1980, Christopher A. Sims suggested using the model for forecasting 
macro time-series. As VAR assumes that all the variables are endogenous, it models 
the variables as an autoregressive function of their lagged values. This pattern is 
beneficiary for our analysis as financial market and real economic variables are in 
fact endogenous ones, therefore we could also obtain exogenous financial shocks and 
avoid the endogeneity problem. We can also mention another aspect, concerning the 
impulse responses which are used as weights, as a result being able to analyze 
dynamic responses of real economy to financial shocks. 
The following SVAR model is estimated individually for each of the countries 
in our sample: 
 
     ( )                                                                                                        (1)     
           
X is a vector of variables presented in the Appendix A. The matrix A contains the 
contemporaneous structural parameters. B(L)is a matrix polynomial in the lag 
operator, L.     is the vector of structural disturbances, such that:  
 
                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
   is a vector of residuals from the corresponding reduced-form VAR.  
We consider important the assumption that emerging economies have a very 
little impact on major advanced economies. Therefore it is proper to treat the foreign 
variable as exogenous to domestic economic variables. A block exogeneity restriction 
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is imposed to our model, which will help to identify foreign shocks from the point of 
view of the small open economy. We are interested only in their impact on such an 
economy, and not in any interaction among domestic variables themselves. (Zha & 
Cushman, 1995).  
To describe the reduced VAR system for a small open economy, we are going 
to divide the set of variables    into two blocks: 
   (         )                                                                                                          (3) 
     (    )                                                                                                              (4) 
     (                      )                                                                             (5) 
where      represents the foreign block, and      represents the domestic block. 
We can also represent the VAR as follows: 
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where    ( ) and    ( )contain the coefficients that correspond to the foreign 
economy while    ( ) and    ( ) contain he coefficients corresponding to the 
domestic economy. The    matrix in equation (1) can also be decomposed as 
follows: 
 
                                                   [
          
          
]                                                   (7) 
 
We assume that the domestic variables do not Granger cause the foreign 
variables, and the later ones are predetermined. Thus a block exogeneity is imposed, 
excluding all domestic variables from the foreign block of equations both 
contemporaneously and in the lag structure of the reduced form VAR. The following 
restrictions are necessary: 
 
         and     ( )                                                                                            (8) 
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As follows we show the vector of structural disturbances in equation (1), 
considering the assumptions made: 
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As a result the Financial Stress Index is not affected contemporaneously by 
the country specific variables. The later ones are ordered following (Mojon & 
Peersman, 2001). Price levels are considered to react contemporaneously to the 
changes in output, being explained by the output-inflation tradeoff. (Romer, 1996) 
According to Taylor Rule principle, the short term interest rates are assumed to 
respond to changes in prices and economic activity or in our case Gross Domestic 
Product. (Taylor, 1993).   
Therefore the matrix of lagged coefficients, B(L), is structured as follows. 
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4.2 Data description 
We are using monthly data from 1999:1 onwards 2009:12 therefore the SVAR model 
we are estimating comprises 132 observations. The sample period is chosen 
conditioned on the availability of data, as for example the Financial Stress Index 
(FSI) constructed by Roberto Cardarelli is available until December 2009. However 
for specific countries the sample period is shorter caused by the unavailability of 
data.  
We should mention that the ten countries that represent the subject of our 
analysis are randomly selected out of the list of Emerging Countries according to 
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IMF classification. All the macroeconomic data are collected from publicly available 
reports and database of domestic institutions such as Statistical Office or Central 
Bank and international institutions such as European Central Bank. Detailed 
description and sources of variables are given in the Appendix A. 
The dataset is comprised of the aggregate FSI of the Advanced Economies 
and macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), nominal interest rate and exchange rates. Since the GDP data are 
available at quarterly frequency, we have applied quadratic match interpolation 
method, after which we had seasonally adjusted the data and log-linearized it. As a 
measure of prices we are using the log-linearized CPI. Moreover we are using as log 
levels in the case of exchange rates. The purpose of these transformations is to 
achieve stability of the VAR system. We have left unchanged the interest rates, 
however their nature differs from country to country, which was conditioned by the 
availability of data. 
As follows we will present the empirical results of our research based on the 
Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model described in the methodology 
section. 
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
As the starting point of our analysis we tried to find the optimal lag length. We can 
observe that Jmulti offered us different results for the countries based on information 
criteria, the optimal number of lags being searched up to 10. The output of 
information criteria results obtained and the lag length selected in each case are 
presented in table 4.1. 
Additionally we run the model with different lags than those offered by the 
software. Therefore we have chosen the lag length fitting best the stability tests 
(CUSUM tests, CHOW test), and showing better capture of the available information 
(residual analysis) in the analysis of the underlying dynamics of the system. As well  
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Table 4.1 Lag length selection criteria output 
 
country AIC FPE HQC SC Lag length chosen for SVAR 
1 Czech Republic 12 11 4 1 4 
2 Hungary 7 7 2 1 3 
3 Poland 7 7 2 1 4 
4 Romania 10 10 1 1 4 
5 Russian Federation 8 7 2 1 3 
6 Brazil 2 2 2 2 2 
7 Turkey 4 4 2 1 2 
8 South Korea 9 9 2 1 3 
9  India 10 10 8 1 3 
10 China 10 4 4 1 5 
 
we tried to keep the lag length as low as possible as to preserve the degrees of 
freedom. 
The estimation coefficients as well as the results of the performed tests can be 
found in the Appendix. These are available only for the lag length chosen for the 
SVAR estimation. 
Impulse responses are performed with a 95% confidence interval that is 
represented by the dashed lines in the respective figures, reflecting uncertainty of the 
estimated coefficients. 
 
4.3.1 Czech Republic 
Figure 4.1 displays the dynamic responses of the output (GDP), prices (CPI), interest 
rates and exchanges rates to the external financial shock which is represented by the 
aggregate FSI of advanced economies.  
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Figure 4.1 Impulse Response of Czech Republic variables to Financial Shock 
Analysing the figure we can observe that an increase in financial stress leads 
to a persistent drop in GDP. The effects are statistically significant during 24 months. 
One standard deviation increase of FSI, representing 147 basis points, leads to a 
decrease of GDP by 0.0124 percentage points (p.p.) after 12 months, which has an 
economicaly neglectible segnificance. Meanwhile same increase in FSI has no 
statistical significant effects over the price levels. The impact of the FSI on interest 
rates is statistically segnificant only for a short period of time starting with month 
four to six. The interest rates drop by 0.0808 p.p. valid for the statistical significant 
period. However the interest rates tend to decline by as much as 0.1327 p.p, and 
starting the month nineteen tend to come back to its initial state. Nevertheless we can 
not be sure of the statistical sinificance of these results.Speaking about the exchange 
rates we can observe statistically significant results starting second month. The local 
currency registers a persistent devaluation comparing to EUR currency throughout 
the period, that is one standard deviation increase in FSI leads to as much as 0.0174 
p.p. change in exchange rate. 
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Figure 4.2 FEVD of Czech Republic variables 
The Forecasted Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) results represented in 
figure 4.2 show that the FSI has a significant predicting power of GDP.  Starting sixth 
lag the FSI manages to predict more than 50 percent of output values. The price 
levels can be mostly predicted by its own lag values for at least five months, after 
which we can notice an increase in predicting power from the side of interest rates 
and exchange rates. Each of them manages to describe up to 13 percent and 41 
percent respectively out of price development. The FSI manages to reach over 5 
percent predicting power only after ninth month. The highest impact on the 
development of interest rates is proved to be its own historical development, 
nevertheless exchange rates can predict up to 29 percent of its development, followed 
by FSI and price levels, having mostly the same impact. Only after thirteen months 
the financial stress manages to have a higher predicting power of exchange rate 
development than its own lags. We should mention that the development of prices 
and interest rates can predict up to 11 percent and 7 percent respectively out of actual 
value of exchange rates. 
 
4.3.2 Hungary 
As follows we are going to present the impulse responses of macro variables related 
to Hungary, as a result of a shock in financial system in advanced countries.  
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Figure 4.3 Impulse Response of Hungary variables to Financial Shock 
Analyzing the figure 4.3 we can see that the only statistical insignificant 
results are obtained in the case of GDP. However we can observe a drop by 0.0021 
p.p. as a result of one standard deviation increase in FSI, the effects diminishing in 
time. Concerning the price level, we can say that it drops by 0.1167 p.p. in the second 
month. As a result of 147 index points increase in FSI we can observe that interest 
rates will increase by 0.1058 p.p. in the first month but tending to return to its initial 
state in the folowing three moths. We can also observe a small devaluation of the 
local currency and mainly the exchange rate is increasing by 0.0043 p.p. which is not 
economically significant.  
 
Figure 4.4 FEVD of Hungary variables 
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Furthermore the analysis of the FEVD could explain us how important are the 
external financial shocks in explaining domestic variables. Thus analyzing the figure 
4.4 we can observe that GDP is predicted mainly by its own lag, but starting fourth 
month we can observe an increase in predicting power of the interest rate reaching up 
to 21 percent. The price levels are mainly influenced by its historical development, 
the FSI having a predicting power of up to 17 percent. We can also observe minor 
influence from interest rates and GDP, and no influence from the side of exchange 
rates. The main drivers in determining the development of interest rate represent its 
own historical development and the exchange rates, the last one managing to predict 
up to 20 percent. Meanwhile the FSI can predict only 6 percent of the interest rate 
development. We can observe the same pattern in the case of exchange rate. Its future 
value is mainly influenced by its own lag, FSI predicting up to 23 percent and being 
followed by the interest rate levels. 
 
4.3.3 Poland 
Figure 4.5 reflects the impulse responses of Poland macroeconomic variables to the 
shock in financial sector of advanced economies.  
We have obtained insignificant results for GDP and interest rate. However 
one standard deviation increase in FSI leads to 0.0030 p.p. increase in price levels, 
which are statistical significant for a short time period sixth to fourteenth month.  
 
Figure 4.5 Impulse Response of Poland variables to Financial Shock 
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In the case of exchange rates, a financial shock in advanced economies leads to an 
increase statistically significant in the first month. The statistical significance period 
continues from fourth to twenty-first month. The local currency devaluation 
continues up to 0.0219 p.p. reached in thirteenth month, after which it slightly 
decreases. 
 Analyzing of the FEVD we can say that the Poland’s GDP is explained 
mainly by its own lags. A minor variation in GDP is also explained by interest rate 
and exchange rate, the later one explains up to 18 percent. The innovation shock of 
advanced economies financial stress explains up to 33 percent of price level growth. 
The rest of the variation is explained by exchange rate – up to 26 percent, GDP – up 
to 25 percent and interest rate – up to 16 percent. However initially the price levels 
manage to be explained by its own lag until sixth month. Corresponding to impulse 
response analysis the FEVD proves that innovation shock of financial stress does not 
explain the variation in interest rate. Nevertheless GDP development predicts up to 
40 percent, the rest of the variation being mainly explained by interest rate lag. 
Financial stress in advanced economies explains up to 38 percent of exchange rate 
variation, though a higher importance in explaining it has its own lag.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 FEVD of Poland variables 
4.3.4 Romania 
 Because there is no available data for GDP (2000:1) and interest rates 
(2003:1), we are going to simulate two different models. The first one includes the 
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full sample period, and the second one includes the period 2003:1 to 2009:12. 
Guiding the stability tests we are going to analyze further only the reduced sample 
period model. 
 Figure 4.7 reflects the impulse responses of Romanian macroeconomic 
variables to innovation in financial stress of advanced economies. Thus 147 index 
points increase in FSI leads to a decrease in GDP by 0.1098 p.p. The results are 
statistically significant throughout the period. We can also say that one standard 
deviation increase in FSI leads to an increase in consumer price index. That is the 
price level is increasing by as much as 0.0095 p.p. The results are significant only 
after nineteenth month. In the case of interest rate we can claim that FSI has no 
significant influence. Our results also indicate that an increase in financial stress leads 
to a depreciation in local currency by 0.0632 p.p. These results are statistically 
significant starting fourth month. 
 
Figure 4.7 Impulse Response of Romania variables to Financial Shock 
Considering the impulse response results we can continue with the FEVD analysis. 
Thus we can observe that nearly 89 percent of the variation in GDP is predicted by 
the financial stress in advanced economies. We can also claim that innovation shock 
of advanced economies financial stress explains up to 38 percent of price level 
growth. The rest of the variation in price level, is explained by its own lag, however 
we should consider the predicting power of exchange rate and GDP. As it was 
expected the FSI has no predicting power over the interest rate, its evolution being 
mainly explained by exchange rate. The later variable however is mainly influenced 
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by the financial stress. Thus up to 79 percent variation in exchange rate is explained 
by the FSI. 
 
Figure 4.8 FEVD of Romania variables 
 
4.3.5 Russian Federation 
 In figure 4.9 we can observe that one standard deviation increase in FSI will 
lead to a constant decrease in GDP by up to 0.0227 p.p. being statistically significant 




Figure 4.9 Impulse Response of Russia variables to Financial Shock 
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The impulse response of CPI indicates an initial increase, after which the 
price level slightly declines. Thus one standard deviation increase in FSI leads to an 
increase by 0.0009 p.p. in price level, after which it decreases to the level of 0.0004 
p.p. The values correspond to the statistical significant period; nevertheless it has no 
economic impact. In response to the shock in FSI, interest rate registers an initial 
decline after which it increases steeply. Considering only the statistic significant 
period we can observe a continuous decrease in interest rate between sixth and 
fifteenth month. Thus from 0.4864 p.p. it decreases to 0.2319 p.p. which makes us 
judge of a negative correlation between the FSI and interest rate. In the case of 
exchange rates the impulse response results are not significant. 
Despite the fact that FSI does not have a high predicting power of the 
domestic variables, the FEVD analysis confirms again the results obtained during 
impulse response analysis. Thus the GDP variation is mainly explained by its own 
lags, the financial stress managing to explain only up to 32 percent. In the case of 
consumer price index, the financial stress in advanced economies has even a lower 
predicting power reaching 11 percent in twentieth month. We can also say that only 
18 percent of variation in interest rates is explained by FSI. A minor influence on its 
development has the exchange rate and price levels, but majorly it can be predicted 
by its own lag. As the impulse response analysis has shown insignificant results in 
the case of exchange rates, the FEVD analysis confirms the results, thus only up to 7 
percent of the variation in exchange rate is predicted by the FSI. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 FEVD of Russia variables 
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4.3.6 Brazil 
We have proceeded with our examining our initial model, however based on 
CUSUM test results, and mainly interest rate being non-stationary, we took logs of 
the respective variable.  
 
Figure 4.11 Impulse Response of Brazil variables to Financial Shock 
Figure 4.11 reflects the impulse response of the Brazil macro variables to one 
standard deviation in FSI. Thus we can say that financial stress in advanced 
economies has statistical significant impact on GDP starting fourth month. 
Throughout the analysis period we can observe an initial decline in GDP after which 
it considerable increases, but the shock’s impact is declining in time. Considering 
only the statistic significant period we can confirm a slight but persistent decline in 
GDP growth which has no economic significant impact. Further we can say that 
impulse responses of CPI to one standard deviation increase in FSI are statistically 
not significant. However 147 index points increase in FSI can lead to a decrease in 
interest rate by as much as 0.0277 p.p., impulse responses being statistically 
significant between eight and nineteenth month. Exchange rates register an initial 
increase as a result to one standard deviation increase in FSI, but the only statistically 
significant result is observed in the first month increasing by 0.0089p.p. 
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Figure 4.12 FEVD of Brazil variables 
The FEVD analysis helps us obtain an introspective view upon the predicting 
power of the financial stress in advanced economies over the domestic macro 
variables. Thus we can say that GDP is mainly explained by its own lags, the FSI 
explaining only up to 5 percent from the variation in economic output. In the case of 
CPI we have obtained insignificant results during impulse response analysis, and this 
is explained by the fact that FSI manages to explain only up to 3 percent of the 
variation in price levels, a major impact having CPI historical development and 
exhange rates. Up to 23 percent of the variation in interest rate is explained by the 
financial stress, which equal to the predicting power of its own lags. The analysis 
shows that it is the exchange rate that have a biger influence upon interest rate 
development. In the case of the later one, the financial stress manages to have a 
higher predicting power in the midle of our analysis period, but it does not exceed 4 




Figure 4.13 shows the results of impulse response of Turkey macro variables as a 
result of one standard deviation increase in FSI.  
The analysis has proven that there is no statistical significant impact of 
financial stress in advance economies on Turkey’s real economy. 
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Figure 4.13 Impulse Response of Turkey variables to Financial Shock 
The FEVD analysis has confirmed our previous obtained results, thus FSI 
manages to explain up to 5 percent of the variation in GDP. Thus the economic 
output is mainly predicted by own historical development and interest rates, which 
manage to explain up to 21 percent of the variation in GDP. Price levels are mainly 
explained by own lags, and interest rates which explain up to 70 percent and 43 
percent respectively of the variation in CPI. The FSI manages to explain only up to 3 
percent. The results also indicate that interest rates are mainly predicted by its 
historical development, the FSI explaining only up to 6 percent of variation in interest 
rates. We can also say similar results are obtained in the case of exchange rate, 
financial stress explaining only up to 7 percent of the variation, a more important 
determinant representing own lags, GDP and CPI. 
 
Figure 4.14 FEVD of Turkey variables 
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4.3.8 South Korea 
During our initial analysis taking log of the variables lead us to questionable results 
that were contradictory to the economic theory. These results were possible caused by 
the instability of the model. First differentiating the variables will lead in loss of 
information, but we reached system stability that is important for VAR. 
Figure 4.15 shows the impulse responses of South Korea macroeconomic 
variables as a consequence of one standard deviation increase in FSI.  
 
Figure 4.15 Impulse Response of South Korea variables to Financial Shock 
The results have shown that financial stress has no statistical impact upon 
GDP and CPI of South Korea. However the analysis has proven statistical significant 
results for the interest rate between second to fifth month, and ninth month. Therefore 
one standard deviation increase in FSI leads to a decrease in interest rate by up to 
0.0465 p.p. The analysis have also shown considerable devaluation of the local 
currency, an increase in financial stress leading to an increase in exchange rate by 
8.6216 p.p statistical significant in the first two months. 
The FEVD analysis is confirming the previous obtained results. The FSI 
manages to explain up to 5 percent and 1 percent of the variation in GDP and CPI 
respectively. In the case of interest rate the highest predicting power has the historical 
development of the variable. Financial stress in advanced countries explains up to 10 
percent of the variation in interest rate. We can observe similar results in the case of 
exchange rate, only 9 percent of variation being explained by the FSI.  
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Figure 4.16 FEVD of South Korea variables 
4.3.9 India 
Figure 4.17 represents the impulse response results of India macro variables as a 
consequence of one standard deviation increase in FSI.  
 
 
Figure 4.17 Impulse Response of India variables to Financial Shock 
Economic output is decreasing by 0.0428 p.p., showing statistical significant 
results starting third to twenty second months. We can also see that CPI is also 
decreasing by up to 0.0049 p.p. in the statistical significant interval which is between 
fourth and tenth month. This may be considered an unexpected result, but there is no 
economically significant impact. We can also say that financial stress in advanced 
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economies has no impact on India’s interest rate, as the results obtained indicate no 
statistically significance. In the case of exchange rate we can observe that one 
standard deviation increase in FSI leads to a persistent devaluation in local currency 
by up to 0.0132 p.p. 
 
Figure 4.18 FEVD of India variables 
 The FEVD analysis shows that up to 54 percent of variation in GDP is 
explained by financial stress. The economic output is also influenced by its own lags, 
price levels and exchange rates. The FSI also manages to predict up to 20 percent of 
variation in price levels, however the main determinant represents its own historical 
development. The impulse response analysis has shown statistical insignificant 
results in the case of interest rates, and now we can claim that FSI explains only up to 
3 percent of the variation in interest rate. Financial stress in advanced economies 
explains up to 50 percent of exchange rate variation, having almost the same 
importance in explaining it as its own lag. 
 
4.3.10 People’s Republic of China 
Figure 4.19 reflects the impulse responses of China macroeconomic variables to 
innovation in financial stress of advanced economies.  
Thus 147 index points increase in FSI leads to a decrease in GDP by as much 
as 0.0116 p.p. We can observe a decrease in GDP however the effect is not stable 
registering a variation in time. The results are statistically significant starting third to 
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thirteenth month than seventeenth to the end of the study period. We can also say that 
one standard deviation increase in FSI leads to a positive but diminishing effect on 
consumer price index. That is the price level is increasing by as much as 0.0015 p.p. 
The results are significant only in seventh and eighth month. In the case of interest 
rate we can claim that FSI has no significant influence. Our results also indicate that 
an increase in financial stress leads to an appreciation in local currency by 0.0073 p.p. 
These results are statistically significant starting eleventh to twentieth month.  
  
  
Figure 4.19 Impulse Response of China variables to Financial Shock 
Analyzing of the FEVD we can say that the China’s GDP’s development  is 
mainly influenced by financial stress in advanced economies and own historical 
development. The innovation shock of advanced economies financial stress explains 
up to 15 percent of price level growth. The main determinant of price level evolution 
still remains its own lags. Despite obtaining insignificant result during impulse 
response analysis, financial stress explains up to 17 percent of variation in interest 
rate. Interest rate is also influenced by economic output, exchange rate and own 
historical development.  In the case of exchange rates we can say that up to 60 
percent of the variation is explained by FSI. 
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Figure 4.20 FEVD of China variables 
 
4.4 Results Interpretation 
Interpreting our results we should take in consideration the fact that the FSI used as a 
proxy for the level of financial shock represents an aggregate value of all FSI in 
Advanced Economies. As countries are not interconnected at the same level, 
depending on different geo-economic criteria, we are expecting a lower intensity in 
the impact global financial shock, originated in developed countries, having upon real 
economy of countries included in our sample.  
Guiding the obtained empirical results we can conclude that a global financial 
shock in developed countries has a persistent contractionary effect upon output. In six 
out of ten countries, output persistently declines starting the first months. Despite the 
fact that we can observe slight variation in GDP growth rates, or differences in 
significance periods, we can observe a long term impact of financial stress on output. 
Comparing the predicting power of Financial Stress Index and domestic variables, we 
can conclude that output in Czech Republic, Romania, India and China have been 
affected more by external financial conditions, while domestic ones account for the 
majority of the variation in Brazil and Russia’s output. The persistency of the 
external financial shock is confirmed in similar researches and findings regarding the 
recent financial crisis, that is: (Babecký & Havrànek, 2012) or (Hwa, April 2012).  
We can also claim that financial shock has a deflationary effect for: China, 
India, Russian Federation and Hungary. The only cases when we registered an 
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inflationary effect are Poland and Romania and no effect for: Czech Republic, Brazil, 
Turkey and South Korea. We should mention that the only statistical significant 
effects in the case of Poland and Romania were observed in long-run, where 
confidence intervals widen. Nevertheless, analyzing the overall influence of financial 
shocks on macroeconomic performance, we concluded that more than 60 percent of 
the variation in prices level can be attributed to country specific factors. 
In five out of ten countries we have identified a statistical significant impact 
of global financial shock upon interest rate. We can conclude that a global financial 
shock in advanced countries leads to an ease of monetary policy in the following 
specific countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Russian Federation, Brazil and South 
Korea. Our results also indicate that more than 70 percent of the variation in interest 
rates is explained by domestic macroeconomic conditions. 
A global financial shock in advanced countries also causes devaluation of 
local currencies, except the Chinese Yuan. The only insignificant results were 
obtained in the case of Russia and Turkey. Our empirical results also indicate that 
exchange rate have been affected more by country specific factors in the majority of 
countries except Romania, China and India, were in long-run financial conditions in 
advanced countries have a higher impact. Knowing this we can explain the Chinese 
Yuan appreciation, being due to the special trade relations between the U.S and 
China. 
As a result we can see that country specific factors have dominant influence in 
the evolution of emerging countries during the recent financial crisis. These results 
majorly reflect the economies’ differing degree of reliance on external financing and 
their role in the world financial system. Transmission channels described in the 
section 3.2 of this paper offer us a general theoretical understanding of the country 
specific factors that can impact the performance of the emerging countries. Further 
analysis could answer whether it is the financial and economic linkages that matter, 
or domestic variables which are driven by policies and structural characteristics. And 
mainly including in our model one of the variables described in section 3.2, which we 
leave for future research. 
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5 Conclusion  
In our study we have seen that the world financial system has suffered serious 
changes due to financial innovation and policy imperfections. Both macroeconomic 
and microeconomic conditions lead to the current financial crisis as we know it 
today. Low interest rates fueled the demand for credits and investments leading to 
significant increase in house prices. On the other side, they also offered the premises 
for financial innovation which was supposed to provide the necessary yield for 
bankers and institutional investors. However the proper drawbacks such as sacrifice 
of transparency and increasing risk, turned to be main causes for losing control over 
the financial system. As concerning the policy imperfection we also discussed the 
moral hazard that is created by the existence of such a concept as Too Big-to-Fail or 
the “shadow” banking.  
Analyzing the available statistics we could observe that the global output 
registered negative dynamics, contracting by an alarming 6.96 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and 5.84 percent in the first quarter of 2009. World economy has 
known decreases in industrial production by 12.07 percent, investments reduced by as 
much as 21.51 percent and world trade by 10.7 percent. The analysis of 
nonperforming loans growth rates gave us a perspective of the dynamics in economy 
and housing market, but impact upon the banking system is sized giving the volumes 
of write-downs that amounted 2.3 trillion U.S. dollars. The performance of countries 
has been heterogeneous, but we could claim that emerging countries registered a 
faster recovery than advanced ones.   
 These results lead us to the idea that the depth of the crisis in each country 
depends on the development and structure of the financial system. And mainly it may 
be and important aspect to be taken in consideration when analyzing the degree of 
interconnectedness between financial sector and economy. On the other side we 
should also consider the channels of financial stress transmission from developed to 
emerging countries, as the recent crisis originated and affected mostly the advanced 
ones. A theoretical overview outlined several channels directly connected to the 
recent financial crisis, such as: the exposure to U.S. asset backed by sub-prime 
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mortgages and dependence of emerging country’s financial institutions on dollar 
financing. Financial stress can also be channeled through trade linkages. Declines in 
exports to developed economies impact majorly in turn the investments and industrial 
production.  
However we find more relevant to classify the channels as common factors 
and country-specific factors. The first one is reflecting the impact of global shocks 
leading to herd behavior, cross-country contagion, and common-lender effect. In this 
group we can include the Financial Stress Index reflecting the market sentiment and 
the financial conditions in developed countries. The country-specific factors mostly 
refer to economic and financial linkages. As well, here we should take in 
consideration the structure of the economy, the development level of the financial 
sector, monetary policy and domestic vulnerabilities, etc.    
Thus applying a SVAR model with block exogeneity restriction we aimed to 
determine if there is any empirical proof of financial stress transmission from 
Developed to Emerging countries. Also determining which of these two groups of 
channels matter the most in the transmission process, will allow us to understand if 
international financial integration represents the decisive factor in Financial Stress 
transmission. 
Our empirical results indicate that financial stress in developed countries has a 
persistent contractionary effect upon output in six out of ten countries in our sample. 
We can also claim that financial stress is significant starting first quarter having a 
long term impact. More, we can also state that for Czech Republic, Romania, India 
and China, the transmission process lies through the common factors, thus financial 
stress in developed countries having a major predicting power, while the country 
specific factors would be more important in the case of Russia and Brazil. 
We have also found that financial stress has a deflationary effect in China, 
India, Russian Federation and Hungary. However our analysis proved that the price 
level variation in sample countries is mainly influenced by country-specific factors. 
Domestic macroeconomic conditions are also dominant in explaining the 
evolution of interest rates. But we also concluded that financial stress in advanced 
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countries leads to an ease of monetary policy, interest rates dropping aiming to offer 
stimuli for economic recovery. 
As a result of our empirical analysis we can also claim that financial stress in 
developed countries causes devaluation of local currency, the Euro and U.S. dollar 
having a better performance during the study period. We also concluded that common 
factors as well as country-specific factors are to be considered in financial stress 
transmission process from developed to emerging countries. The first group of factors 
is relevant only for Romania, China and India. 
Overall as a result of our analysis we realized that the financial stress 
transmission from developed to emerging countries has been complex and cannot be 
reduced to analyzing the issue from one aspect. We can observe a major influence of 
country-specific factors in explaining the evolution and variation in domestic 
variables, respectively we can conclude that economic and financial linkages, or 
better said, the level of international financial integration of the specific countries 
represents an important condition for the financial stress transmission. Nevertheless 
analyzing the performance of output in respective countries, in four out of six 
countries where a significant impact was registered, common factors represent the 
main drivers. Therefore we can conclude that a cross country contagion took place. In 
conclusion we would like to state that it would not be correct to attribute a single 
cause or factor as being determinant for the financial stress transmission from 
developed to emerging countries. 
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Gross Domestic Product from the Income Side, Current 
Prices; mil. Kč / CZK mil. 
1999-2009 Czech National Bank 
CPI Real price level, Annual CPI (%) 1999-2009 Czech National Bank 
Interest PRIBOR rates - monthly and yearly averages (%) 1999-2009 Czech National Bank 
Exchange rate ECB reference exchange rate, Czech koruna/Euro 1999-2009 European Central Bank 
Hungary 
GDP Gross Domestic Product at current prices 1999-2009 Hungarian Statistical Office 
CPI Core inflation based on December 1994, Price level 1999-2009 Hungarian Statistical Office 
Interest BUBOR (Budapest Interbank Offer Rate) (%) 1999-2009 Hungarian Statistical Office 
Exchange rate ECB reference exchange rate, Hungarian forint/Euro 1999-2009 European Central Bank 
Romania 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product, CAEN time series; Million lei + 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2008-2012 - 
UNADJUSTED SERIES; millions of lei curent price 
2000-2009 National Institute of Statistics 
CPI Inflation, Price level 1999-2009 National Institute of Statistics 
Interest Monetary policy interest rate, %p.a. 2003-2009 National Institute of Statistics 
Exchange rate 
ECB reference exchange rate, Romanian lei/Euro;   
Starting 1st July 2005, 1RON = 10,000 ROL 
1999-2009 European Central Bank 
Poland 
GDP Current prices, in PLN millions 1999-2009 National Bank of Poland 
CPI 
Current inflation (CPI y/y lagged 2 months, known to 
respondents when the survey was carried out) 
1999-2009 National Bank of Poland 
Interest Refinancing rate (%) 1999-2009 National Bank of Poland 
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Exchange rate ECB reference exchange rate, Polish zloty/Euro 1999-2009 European Central Bank 
Russia 
GDP Gross Domestic Product in current prices, trillion Rubles 1999-2009 Central Bank of Russia 





Interbank Rate - monthly average rate MIACR on 




Exchange rate ECB reference exchange rate,Russian rubl/Euro 1999-2009 European Central Bank 
Turkey 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic Activity in 
Basic Prices (At Current and Fixed (1998)  
1999-2009 
Cenral Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
CPI 
1994 Based Consumer Price Index Numbers, 1994-2006 
(*)  The index numbers following January 2006 are 
derived using the monthly rate of change in 2003=100 
consumer price index. 
1999-2009 
Cenral Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
Interest Interest Rates on Deposits; TP.FA.F07.1 1999-2009 
Cenral Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
Exchange rate ECB reference exchange rate,Turkish lira/Euro 1999-2009 European Central Bank 
South Korea 
GDP 
GDP and GNI by Kind of Economic Activity (at current 
prices, quarterly & annual) 
1999-2009 The Bank of Korea 
CPI 
Consumer price index (2005=100) - South Korea - Index;  
Brasilian Central Bank 
1999-2009 The Bank of Korea 
Interest Yields on CD(91-day)  / per annum 1999-2009 The Bank of Korea 
Exchange rate South Korean Won / US dollar 1999-2009 
Pacific Exchange Rate Service;     
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html  
Brazil 
GDP GDP monthly - current prices (R$ million)  1999-2009 Banco Central do Brazil 
CPI Consumer Price Index-Brazil (IPC-Br) - Monthly % var. 1999-2009 Banco Central do Brazil 
Interest Selic accumulated in the month in annual terms - % p.y. 1999-2009 Banco Central do Brazil 
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Exchange rate Brazilian Real / US dollar 1999-2009 Banco Central do Brazil 
China 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (100 Million Yuan) 1999-2009 Peple's Bank of China 
CPI Consumer Price Index 1999-2009 Peple's Bank of China 
Interest 
Trading Statistics of National Interbank Market  Weighted 
Average Interest Rate  3M 
1999-2009 Peple's Bank of China 
Exchange rate Amounting to one U.S. dollar (average) 1999-2009 Peple's Bank of China 
India 
GDP 
GDP at current prices, base year 1996-1997; tens of 
millions;  
1999-2009 Reserve Bank of India 
CPI 
Consumer price index of all items for industrial workers, 
base year 2001 
2001-2009 
Labor Bureau of the Government of 
India 
Interest RBU Bank Rate; percent p.a. 2002-2009 Reserve Bank of India Bank Rate 
Exchange rate INR/USD 1999-2009 PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service 
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There is a DVD enclosed to this thesis which contains empirical data and JMulti 
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